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CBT = chemical–biological terrorism; JCAHO = Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations.
Available online http://ccforum.com/content/5/6/323
The Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (JCAHO) requires hospitals to have a disaster
plan and to periodically run internal (i.e. a fire in the base-
ment) and external (i.e. 100 injuries at a rock concert) disas-
ter drills. These drills often involve a simulated traumatic
event, such as an explosion, a fire, a building collapse, or a
major plane crash. Everyone involved is aware that the event
is a drill and patients with simulated injuries appear, often dis-
rupting busy emergency departments and hospitals. Most
drills evaluate an individual hospital’s response and rarely
evaluate a region’s ability to adapt to varying resources and
governance requirements. These drills seem to bring in (simu-
lated) patients in a manner unlike that of real disasters.
Lessons learned from the multi-city 11 September 2001
disaster suggest that previous planning methods did not
prepare the hospitals for what really happened. For example,
patients suffering trauma in Washington DC were taken to
Walter Reed Hospital, not a designated trauma center, which
was not part of a planned regional response. In New York
City, the bulk of the injuries arriving at nearby hospitals were
not life threatening, tying up manpower and resources. All the
lessons learnt from previous JCAHO drills vanished as situa-
tions erupted that could not have been anticipated.
There are ways, however, in which those in charge have pre-
viously dealt with unexpected situations effectively. All hospi-
tals experience mini-disasters, such as no intensive care unit
beds during each year’s flu season, spillage of insecticides in
a large closed office, and 20-car pile ups on a freeway, that
never reach the national press or even local public notice.
Administrators, engineers, chiefs of staff, emergency center
physicians, and seasoned head nurses imprint their experi-
ences in their personal memories and adapt these experi-
ences to the next catastrophe. This adaptability is
undoubtedly as valuable, if not more so, as the written disas-
ter plan or JCAHO mandated drills. In the light of the lessons
learned from the World Trade Center attack, the JCAHO
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Abstract
When a disaster occurs, it is for governments to provide the leadership, civil defense, security,
evacuation, and public welfare. The medical aspects of a disaster account for less than 10% of
resource and personnel expenditure. Hospitals and health care provider teams respond to unexpected
occurrences such as explosions, earthquakes, floods, fires, war, or the outbreak of an infectious
epidemic. In some geographic locations where natural disasters are common, such as earthquakes in
Japan, such disaster practice drills are common. In other locations, disaster drills become pro forma
and have no similarity to real or even projected and predicted disasters. The World Trade Center
disaster on 11 September 2001 provides new information, and points out new threats, new
information systems, new communication opportunities, and new detection methodologies. It is time
for leaders of medicine to re-examine their approaches to disaster preparedness.
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should make major changes in their disaster preparedness
process.
Bureaucracy
Bureaucracy breeds inaction. As many as 60 federal agen-
cies and 30–50 diverse public safety and security agencies,
offices, and organizations exist in most large cities, many
functioning independently of and without coordination with
others. At the operational level, these public safety groups
often do not even have the ability to communicate with each
other by common radio frequency. These agencies, often
involving multiple counties and crossing numerous authori-
ties, must be able to communicate and function as one unit
for the good of all.
In the flood following Tropical Storm Allison on 6 June 2001,
the Houston Fire Department Emergency Medical Services
were able to communicate with the only remaining Level 1
trauma center and preserved it for major life threatening
emergencies. Unfortunately, the 35 or so regional private
ambulances were unable to communicate with either the
Houston Fire Department Emergency Medical Services or the
hospital, and consequently overloaded the Level 1 trauma
center with clinic patients.
Disasters will forever be dated as pre-World Trade Center
and post-World Trade Center. Terrorism is as old as
recorded history, but it took on a new meaning as of 11 Sep-
tember 2001 (it is ironic that this date corresponds to the
emergency call sign of 911). Terrorism has in the past been
local, but now it is international. Recent books, both fiction
and nonfiction, repeatedly alert (and often frighten) the public
to the many faces of terrorism. Some of these books, such as
Germs [1] and The Cobra Event [2], cite acts of bioterrorism.
In early October 2001, the threat of chemical–biological ter-
rorism (CBT) has reached new heights of public awareness,
creating some panic and hysteria, and creating significant
heightened awareness and frustration in hospitals and among
health care workers. Documents addressing CBT prepared-
ness at the regional government and hospital level are being
revised at breakneck speed but with questionable efficiency.
A diversionary and ‘cover-up’ approach is often applied to a
perceived problem by buying equipment and stockpiling
drugs prior to establishing a realistic policy and developing
an infrastructure of real-time response.
Detection systems of incident reporting, Gram staining, bac-
terial culture, and purchasing of new chemical identification
may not prevent a viral or chemical contamination of a hospi-
tal emergency department. The first several contaminated
patients might go undetected because their symptoms
resemble common illnesses. For instance, every emergency
center in the United States receives patients daily with pneu-
monia, fever, bronchial wheezing, conjunctivitis, nausea, vom-
iting, flu, and diarrhea. These are the very symptoms of
exposure to most agents of CBT. These operational and
logistical problems offer tremendous challenges to the health
care systems of a region. With the tremendous national inter-
est in CBT, hospitals and their purchased stores of resources
will be rapidly overrun by federal agents once a CBT event
has been identified. The hospital personnel will then lose
control of the governance, and bureaucracy will overwhelm
much of their disaster plan. Perhaps these federal and gov-
ernmental interventions should be part of every hospital’s dis-
aster drill to ensure everyone is ‘on the same page’ when the
need occurs.
Lessons learned in 2001
We must never disregard or become desensitized to the
lessons learned from the disasters of 2001 (Houston floods,
World Trade Center/Pentagon plane crashes, anthrax mail-
ings) that have brought the lessons from prior disasters into
perspective. They all share similarities from which we can
learn. We have learned that communications from command
centers and hospitals to private ambulances are improbable.
Potential health care providers in the community cannot be
adequately identified and utilized for many logistic and turf
impediments (i.e. who is in charge?, who gets the credit?,
which agency has specific authority?). Following the earth-
quakes in Mexico City, the explosion in Oklahoma City, the
World Trade Center attack, the floods in Houston, and the
events in Atlanta during the Olympics (to name just those
within North America), large numbers of major trauma
patients did not arrive at the hospitals and trauma centers for
reasons that simply must be fixed. This happened simply
because there were no large numbers of patients with major
and life threatening wounds that arrived at the hospitals alive.
During the World Trade Center rescue operations, trauma
patients in Washington DC were taken to a hospital without a
trauma program (Walter Reed), while a hospital with a trauma
program in the Washington DC area did not receive major
trauma patients. This is not acceptable. With its stated
mission of preparedness for medical support during times of
war, perhaps the US Army’s largest hospital, Walter Reed,
should develop a trauma center for the greater Washington
DC area. It is imperative that such a designated trauma
center concept be adequately funded and maintained
because, with the closure of the DC General Hospital, Wash-
ington DC is left with a paucity of trauma care facilities, and it
is logical that the US Army’s largest hospital should have a
center that corresponds to the major mission of military medi-
cine. Furthermore, in each of the cities where disasters have
occurred, the message continues that there is often an
excess of doctors but too few skilled nurses, especially in
emergency rooms, intensive care units, and operating rooms.
We must create pay schedules that encourage people to
enter this professional field, and treat them accordingly.
The multiple governmental agencies in a region must create
effective and practical methodologies for coordination andr
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communication. The ability of the Federal Emergency
Management Administration and the National Disaster
Management System to respond to multiple locations is in
question. It has been discovered that, in many regions, the
National Disaster Management System identification of avail-
able beds is carried out solely at the hospital administrator
level, and that critical care and trauma directors have been
totally left out of the local loop regarding bed allocation and
capability of the medical staff response. Just as the American
College of Surgeons Trauma Center Verification Review
Committee, the JCAHO disaster drill requirements, and the
local disaster plans need to be updated, the many and often
confusing and overlapping federal programs (especially the
Federal Emergency Management Administration and the
National Disaster Management System) need careful re-
evaluation. The exact role and capability of the military
medical establishment requires very special discussion, as it
will be imperative in maintaining order.
Are we prepared?
The most common question asked of medical leadership is
‘Are we prepared for x?’, where x denotes the unexpected
and the unknown. The answer, of course, is that one can
never be totally prepared. The challenges and frustrations of
the 11 September 2001 disaster cannot be overestimated.
Health care providers, of all levels, are caring and versatile
groups, and are ready, willing, and dedicated to providing the
best multifaceted care possible during unexpected disasters,
but there must be effective frameworks in which that care is
carried out. This framework must be constructed by leaving
egos and personal agendas at the front door and working for
a common benefit. Health care providers are not willing or
prepared to discuss the numerous political and economic
issues that underlie health care policy making, but perhaps
the events of 11 September 2001 will encourage us all to
begin to address these outstanding nonmedical barriers to
complete readiness.
KM has been part of disaster management planning at hospital,
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